We propose a new general primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (lossy TDFs), and realize it under a variety of different number theoretic assumptions, including hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem and the worstcase hardness of lattice problems.
INTRODUCTION
A central goal in cryptography is to realize a variety of security notions based on plausible and concrete computational assumptions. Historically, such assumptions have typically been concerned with number theoretic problems from one of three broad categories: those related to factoring integers, those related to computing discrete logarithms in cyclic groups, and more recently, those related to computational problems on lattices.
It is important to design secure cryptographic schemes based on all three categories, for several reasons: first, to act as a hedge against advances in cryptanalysis, e.g., improved algorithms for one class of problems or the construction of a practical quantum computer; second, to justify the generality of abstract notions; third, to develop new outlooks and techniques that can cross-pollinate and advance the field as a whole.
In public key cryptography in particular, two of the most important notions are trapdoor functions (TDFs) and security under chosen ciphertext attack (CCA security) [30, 35, 16] . The former is an idea going all the way back to the seminal paper of Diffie and Hellman [14] , while the latter has become the de facto notion of security for public key encryption.
Unfortunately, it is still not known how to realize TDFs and CCA security under all types of problems listed above. For CCA security, there are secure constructions based on problems related to factoring and discrete log [30, 16, 12, 13] , but not lattices. For trapdoor functions, the situation is even less satisfactory: though TDFs are widely viewed as a general primitive, they have so far been realized only from problems related to factoring [38, 34, 31] .
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce a new general primitive called lossy trapdoor functions, and show how to realize it based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in cyclic groups, and the hardness of worst-case problems on lattices.
• We show that lossy trapdoor functions imply injective (one-to-one) trapdoor functions in the traditional sense. This yields the first known trapdoor functions based on number theoretic problems that are not directly related to integer factorization.
• We present a black-box construction of a CCA-secure cryptosystem based on lossy TDFs. Notably, our decryption algorithm is witness recovering, i.e., it first recovers the randomness that was used to create the ciphertext, and then tests the validity of the ciphertext simply by reencrypting the message under the retrieved randomness. Until now, witness-recovering CCA-secure cryptosystems were only known to exist in the random oracle model [4, 19] .
Our approach has two main benefits: first, our construction is black-box, making it more efficient than those following the general NIZK paradigm [6, 30, 16, 39] . 1 Second, ours is the first known construction of a CCA-secure cryptosystem based entirely on lattice assumptions, for which there is currently no known realization in the NIZK framework.
• We further demonstrate the utility of lossy TDFs by constructing collision-resistant hash functions and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols, in a black-box manner.
Using standard (but non-black box) transformations [24, 25] , this implies general secure multiparty computation for malicious adversaries.
Trapdoor Functions and Witness Recovering Decryption
One interesting and long-standing question in cryptography is whether it is possible to construct trapdoor functions from any cryptosystem that is secure under a chosenplaintext attack (CPA-secure) [3] . One tempting approach is to encrypt the function's random input x using x itself as the randomness, so that decrypting with the secret key (i.e., the trapdoor) returns x. This method has several potential benefits. First, the construction is very straightforward and efficient. Second, the technique could be extended to build a CCA-secure cryptosystem: the encryption algorithm would simply choose a random string r and encrypt it along with the "true" message m, also using r as the randomness to the encryption. The decryption algorithm would check for well-formedness of a ciphertext by first decrypting, yielding the message m and randomness r, and then would simply recompute the ciphertext to verify that it matches the input ciphertext. Indeed, approaches like these have proved fruitful in the random oracle model [3, 4, 19] .
Unfortunately, the technique of encrypting a ciphertext's own randomness has so far met with less success in the standard model, because CPA security is guaranteed only if the randomness is chosen independently of the encrypted message. For example, consider a (pathological) encryption algorithm E , which is built from another (secure) encryption algorithm E: the algorithm E (m; r) normally returns E(m; r), except if m = r it simply outputs r. Then the candidate trapdoor function f (x) = E (x; x) is simply the identity function, which is trivial to invert.
While this is just a contrived counterexample for one particular attempt, Gertner, Malkin, and Reingold [22] demonstrated a black-box separation between (poly-to-one) trapdoor functions and CPA-secure encryption. The chief difficulty is that inverting a trapdoor function requires the recovery of its entire input, whereas decrypting a ciphertext recovers the input message, but not necessarily the randomness. For similar reasons, there is also some evidence that achieving CCA security from CPA security (in a black-box manner) would be difficult [21] .
Perhaps for these reasons, constructions of CCA-secure encryption in the standard model [30, 16, 39, 12, 13] have followed a different path. As explained in [17] , all the techniques used so far have employed a "two-key" construction, where the well-formedness of a ciphertext is guaranteed by a (simulation-sound) non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof. A primary benefit of zero-knowledge is that the decryption algorithm can be guaranteed that a ciphertext is well-formed without needing to know a witness to that fact (e.g., the input randomness). The two-key/NIZK paradigm has led to CCA-secure encryption based on general assumptions, such as trapdoor permutations [16] , and efficient systems based on specific number theoretic assumptions [12, 13] , such as the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) [7] and composite residuosity [31] assumptions. However, the NIZK approach has two significant drawbacks. First, the constructions from general assumptions are inefficient, as they are inherently non-black-box. Second, while CPA-secure public key cryptosystems based on worst-case lattice assumptions are known [1, 36, 37] , there are still no known CCA-secure systems, because it is unknown how to realize NIZKs for all of NP under such assumptions.
The Power of Losing Information
In this paper we revisit the idea of building trapdoor functions and witness-recovering CCA-secure encryption, in the standard model. As discussed above, past experience seems to suggest that a stronger notion than chosen-plaintext security might be needed.
We introduce a new approach that is centered around the idea of losing information. Specifically, we introduce a new primitive called a lossy trapdoor function, which is a public function f that is created to behave in one of two ways. The first way matches the usual completeness condition for an (injective) trapdoor function: given a suitable trapdoor for f , the entire input x can be efficiently recovered from f (x). In the second way, f statistically loses a significant amount of information about its input, i.e., f 's image is significantly smaller than its domain. Finally, the two behaviors are indistinguishable: given just the description of f , no efficient adversary can tell whether f is injective or lossy.
Using lossy trapdoor functions as a general tool, we develop new techniques for constructing standard trapdoor functions and CCA-secure cryptosystems, and proving their security. In essence, lossy TDFs allow us to prove security via indistinguishability arguments over the public parameters of a scheme (e.g., the public key of a cryptosystem), as opposed to the adversary's challenge value (e.g., the challenge ciphertext in the CCA game).
In more detail, the public parameters of our schemes will include some function f that is either injective or lossy. In the former case, typically corresponding to the real system, the invertibility of f will permit recovery of its entire input and will ensure correctness of the system. In the latter case, the lossiness of f will imply that the scheme becomes statistically secure. The advantage of this approach is that when distinguishing between injective and lossy f in the security reduction, the simulator can always create the adversary's challenge "honestly," i.e., knowing its underlying randomness.
In the following, we demonstrate the utility of lossy TDFs by informally sketching constructions of standard TDFs, CPA-secure encryption, and CCA-secure encryption. (Formal definitions, constructions, and proofs are given in the full version of our paper [33] .)
Trapdoor Functions and CPA-Secure Encryption
Suppose we have a collection of lossy TDFs having domain {0, 1} n , where the lossy functions "lose" (say) k = n/2 bits of the input. Then the injective functions from this collection make up a collection of standard trapdoor functions. To see this, first consider the behavior of a hypothetical inverter I for an injective function f . If we choose x ← {0, 1} n uniformly and give (f, f(x)) to I, it must output the same value of x (with some noticeable probability), because f is injective. Now by the indistinguishability of lossy and injective functions, the same must be true when f is replaced with a lossy function f . However, f (x) statistically hides the value of x, because there are on average about 2
other values x such that f (x ) = f (x), and all are equally likely. Therefore even an unbounded inverter I cannot guess the unique value of x. We conclude that no poly-time inverter can exist for the injective functions either, unless the injective and lossy functions are distinguishable. Using the fact that lossy TDFs imply standard injective TDFs, we could construct a CPA-secure cryptosystem by standard techniques, e.g., by using a generic Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate [23] to conceal the message bit. However, it is instructive (and a useful warm-up for our CCAsecure construction) to see that lossy TDFs admit (multibit) hard-core functions with a very simple and direct proof of security.
Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} , where {0, 1} n is the domain of the lossy TDFs and < n is a parameter determined by the lossiness (we defer details for the purposes of this sketch). Then a hash function h chosen at random from H acts as a hard-core function for the injective TDFs of the collection. This follows from the fact that h is a strong randomness extractor, by a variant of the leftover hash lemma [27, 15] .
In more detail, consider an adversary that attempts to distinguish h(x) ∈ {0, 1} from uniform, given h and f (x) for injective f and uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1} n . The adversary's advantage must be essentially the same if f is replaced with a randomly-chosen lossy function. In this case, the value of x is statistically well-hidden given f (x) (more precisely, x has large min-entropy on the average). Because h is a good extractor, it follows that h(x) is statistically close to uniform over {0, 1} given f (x) and h, so even an unbounded adversary has negligible advantage.
CCA-Secure Encryption
The construction of CCA-secure cryptosystems is more challenging, because the adversary is allowed to make decryption (i.e., inversion) queries. If we simply replace an injective function with a lossy function, then the simulator will not be able to answer (even well-formed) decryption queries, because the plaintext information is lost. Therefore we introduce a richer abstraction called all-but-one (ABO) trapdoor functions, which can be constructed from a collection of sufficiently lossy TDFs, or directly from similar underlying concrete assumptions.
An ABO collection is associated with a large set B that we call branches. The generator of an ABO function takes an extra parameter b * ∈ B, called the lossy branch, and outputs a function g(·, ·) and a trapdoor t. The function g has the property that for any branch b = b * , the function g(b, ·) is injective (and can be inverted with t), but the function g(b * , ·) is lossy. Moreover, the lossy branch is hidden (computationally) by the description of g.
Cryptosystem.
Our construction of a CCA-secure cryptosystem uses a collection of lossy TDFs and a collection of ABO TDFs, both having domain {0, 1}
n . As before, we use a pairwise independent family of hash functions H from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} , where is the length of the plaintext. For full CCA2 security (and in particular, non-malleability), we also use a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme, where the set of possible verification keys is a subset of the branch set B of the ABO collection.
2 In this sketch we give only the main ideas, and defer the exact selection of parameters to the full version of our paper [33] .
The key generator for the cryptosystem chooses an injective function f from the lossy TDF collection, along with its trapdoor f −1 . Next, it chooses an ABO function g whose lossy branch is arbitrarily set to b * = 0 (the decrypter does not need the trapdoor for g, so it can be discarded). Finally, it selects a hash function h at random from H. The public key is pk = (f, g, h), and the trapdoor f −1 is kept as the secret decryption key (along with pk itself).
The encryption algorithm encrypts a message m ∈ {0, 1} as follows: it first generates a verification key vk and corresponding signing key skσ for the one-time signature scheme. It then chooses an x ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random. The ciphertext is generated as
where σ is a signature of (c1, c2, c3) under the signing key skσ. We emphasize that both f and g are evaluated on the same x, and that g is evaluated on the branch corresponding to vk.
The decryption algorithm attempts to decrypt a ciphertext c = (vk, c1, c2, c3, σ) as follows: it begins by checking that the signature σ is valid relative to vk, and aborts if not. Next, it computes x = f −1 (c1) using the trapdoor, obtaining an encryption witness x . Then the decrypter "recomputes" the ciphertext to verify that it is well formed, by checking that c1 = f (x ) and c2 = g(vk, x ), and aborting if not. Finally, it outputs the message m = h(x ) ⊕ c3.
Security.
The proof of security follows a hybrid two key-type argument, but without zero knowledge (due to the recovery of the encryption witness). The proof involves several hybrid experiments that are indistinguishable to any efficient adversary. In the first hybrid, the ABO lossy branch b * is instead set to b * = vk * , where vk * is a verification key that eventually appears in the challenge ciphertext. In the next hybrid, the decryption oracle decrypts using the trapdoor g −1 for the ABO function, rather than f −1 . The decryption oracle is thus able to decrypt successfully for all branches but one, namely, the vk * branch -but by unforgeability of the signature scheme, any query involving vk * has an invalid signature and can be rejected out of hand. The final step of the hybrid involves replacing the injective function f with a lossy one. At this point, we observe that both components c1 = f (x) and c2 = g(vk * , x) of the challenge ciphertext lose information about x. Therefore, h(x) is statistically close to uniform (given the rest of the view of the adversary), so even an unbounded adversary has only negligible advantage in guessing the encrypted message.
We conclude this summary with a few remarks. First, we note that in practice one would likely use our techniques as a public-key key extraction mechanism (KEM) where the key would be derived using the hash function as h(x). Second, while our system falls outside of the NIZK paradigm, we do use some techniques that are reminiscent of previous work. Our construction uses a two-key strategy originally due to Naor and Yung [30] , where during hybrid experiments the simulator uses one key to decrypt the ciphertext, while it participates in a distinguishing experiment related to the other key. The major difference is that in the NIZK paradigm, the distinguishing experiment is on a ciphertext corresponding to the other key. In constrast, our simulation participates in a distinguishing experiment on the other key itself. Additionally, our use of one-time signatures for CCA2 security inherits from the work of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [16] , and is technically most similar to the method of Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [11] for constructing CCA-secure encryption from identity-based encryption. Finally, we point out that our decryption algorithm does not strictly recover all the randomness of the ciphertext, because it does not recover the randomness used to generate the one-time signing key or the signature itself. This is a minor technical point, as the decrypter does recover enough randomness to check validity of the ciphertext (the signature is publicly verifiable). Additionally, for weaker CCA1 security, the one-time signature is not needed; vk can be replaced with a random choice of branch, and the decrypter does recover all of the randomness in this case.
Realizing Lossy TDFs
We now sketch our basic framework for constructing lossy and all-but-one trapdoor functions. To illuminate the main principles, we assume a generic CPA-secure cryptosystem having a few special (but informally described) properties. We then sketch how to obtain such properties under concrete assumptions.
The first property we assume is that the underlying cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. A function f (whether injective or lossy) on {0, 1} n is specified by an entry-wise encryption of some n × n matrix M. To evaluate f (x), view the input x ∈ {0, 1} n as an n-dimensional binary vector x, and compute an (entry-wise) encryption of the linear product x · M by applying the homomorphic operation to the encrypted entries of M.
For an injective function, the encrypted matrix M is the identity matrix I, and the trapdoor is the decryption key for the cryptosystem. The function f is therefore injective and invertible with the trapdoor, because f (x) is an entry-wise encryption of x · I = x, which can be decrypted to recover each bit of x.
For a lossy function, the encrypted matrix M is the allzeros matrix M = 0. Then for every input x, the value f (x) is an entry-wise encryption of the all-zeros vector, so f intuitively "loses" x. However, this alone is not enough to ensure lossiness, because the output ciphertexts still carry some internal randomness that might leak information about the input. Therefore we need some additional ideas to control the behavior of this randomness.
We rely on two other special properties of the cryptosystem. First, we require that it remains secure to reuse randomness when encrypting under different keys. Second, we require that the homomorphic operation isolates the randomness, i.e., that the randomness of the output ciphertext depends only on the randomness of the input ciphertexts (and not, say, on the key or the encrypted messages). Many known cryptosystems are even homomorphic with respect to randomness, which certainly suffices for our purposes.
With these two properties, we encrypt the matrix M in a special way. Each column j of the matrix is associated with a different key pkj, and the trapdoor is the set of corresponding decryption keys. Across each row i, we encrypt entry mi,j under key pkj and the same randomness ri (using fresh randomness for each row). By hypothesis, it is secure to reuse randomness across keys pkj, so the matrix M is computationally hidden. Additionally, because the homomorphism isolates randomness, all the ciphertexts in the output vector f (x) are also encrypted under the same randomness R (which depends only on r1, . . . , rn and x).
When M = I, we can still invert the function (given the trapdoor) by decrypting each ciphertext entry of f (x). On the other hand, when M = 0, the function output is always a vector of encrypted zero messages, where each entry is encrypted under the same randomness (but under a different fixed key). Therefore the number of possible outputs of f is bounded by the number of possible random strings that can arise. By choosing the dimension n so that the number of inputs 2 n is significantly larger than the number of random strings, we can guarantee that the function is lossy.
The construction of all-but-one trapdoor functions is more general. Each branch b of the function simply corresponds to a different matrix M b , whose encryption can be produced from the public description of the function. The function is generated so that M b is an invertible matrix (and is computable with the trapdoor) for all the injective branches b, whereas M b * = 0 for the lossy branch b * .
Concrete assumptions.
Under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, it is relatively straightforward to implement the above framework for constructing lossy and all-but-one TDFs (see Section 3). On the other hand, when working with lattice-based cryptosystems [1, 36, 37] , many additional technical difficulties arise. In fact, we only know how to construct lossy TDFs based on the "learning with errors" (LWE) problem, a generalization of the "learning parity with noise" problem defined by Regev [37] . The LWE problem can be seen as an average-case "unique decoding" problem on a certain family of random lattices, and is believed (like the learning parity with noise problem) to be hard. Moreover, Regev gave a reduction showing that LWE is hard on the average if standard lattice problems are hard in the worst case for quantum algorithms [37] . Quantum algorithms are not known to have any advantage over classical algorithms for the worst-case lattice problems in question. Indeed, it seems plausible that the reduction could be "dequantized".
There are two reasons why our lattice-based constructions seem to be limited to LWE. First, the LWE problem involves some public randomness that can be securely reused, whereas the underlying hard problems of [1, 36] involve secret randomness that is not apparently reusable in a secure way. The second difficulty is that lattice-based cryptosystems involve some non-reusable error terms, which leak additional information in our constructions. The error terms in [1, 36] are exponentially large, therefore they may leak more bits than we are able to lose via our matrix construction. In constrast, the error terms in the LWE problem are only polynomially large, so their leakage can be bounded appropriately (this requires careful trade-offs and some additional techniques; see [33] for details).
Lossy Trapdoors in Context
It is informative to consider lossy trapdoors in the context of previous systems. A crucial technique in using lossy trapdoors is that security is typically demonstrated via indistinguishability arguments over a scheme's public parameters, as opposed to its outputs. Prior constructions of CPA-secure lattice-based cryptosystems [1, 36, 37] used this style of argument, but to our knowledge it has not been employed very widely for proving other notions of security.
The present approach can be contrasted with the oblivious transfer (OT) paradigm of Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [18] . Their approach constructs (semi-honest) oblivious transfer protocols from any public key cryptosystem in which a public key can be sampled without knowing its corresponding decryption key (or equivalent). In the OT protocol, one of the messages is encrypted under such a public key, thereby hiding it computationally from the receiver. Lossy TDFs can be employed to construct OT in a similar way, but the security properties are reversed: one can sample a lossy public key that is only computationally indistinguishable from a "real" one, but messages encrypted under the lossy key are statistically hidden.
Another interesting comparison is to the techniques used to prove CCA security from Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [40] that were introduced by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [11] and improved in later work [9, 10, 8] . Our construction and simulation share some techniques with these works, but also differ in important ways. In the constructions based on IBE, the simulator is able to acquire secret keys for all identities but one special identity ID * , and can therefore answer decryption queries in the CCA experiment. The special identity ID * is hidden statistically by the public key, while the challenge ciphertext encrypted under ID * hides its message only computationally. In our simulation, the security properties are once again reversed: the lossy branch b * is hidden only computationally by the public key, but the challenge ciphertext hides its message statistically.
Our concrete constructions of lossy TDFs under the DDH assumption (by reusing randomness across many encryption keys) are technically similar to the ElGamal-like cryptosystems of Bellare et al. [2] that reuse randomness for efficiency, and to constructions of pseudorandom synthesizers by Naor and Reingold [29] . In particular, indistinguishability of injective and lossy functions follows directly from pseudorandomness. The novelty in our constructions is in the use of additional homomorphic structure to compute encrypted linear products, and to bound the number of possible outputs in the lossy case.
Finally, recent and independent work of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [20] demonstrates "naturally-occurring" (non-injective) trapdoors for hard random lattices. The techniques in that work are completely different from ours, and seem best suited for complementary cryptographic applications (e.g., signatures schemes and identity-based encryption).
Organization
In this extended abstract we provide the definitions of lossy TDFs and all-but-one trapdoor functions (Section 2). In Section, 1.3 we give our DDH-based realization of lossy TDFs. Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to our full paper [33] for our constructions of CCA-secure cryptosystems and our lattice realizations of lossy TDFs.
LOSSY AND ALL-BUT-ONE TRAPDOOR FUNCTIONS

Lossy TDFs
Here we define lossy trapdoor functions. Define the following quantities as functions of the security parameter: n(λ) = poly(λ) represents the input length of the function and k(λ) ≤ n(λ) represents the lossiness of the collection. For convenience, we also define the residual leakage r(λ) := n(λ) − k(λ). For all these quantities, we often omit the dependence on λ.
A collection of (n, k)-lossy trapdoor functions is given by a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms (S ltdf , F ltdf , F −1 ltdf ) having the properties below. For notational convenience, define the algorithms Sinj(·) := S ltdf (·, 1) and S loss (·) := S ltdf (·, 0).
Easy to sample an injective function with trapdoor:
Sinj ( Note that we make no explicit requirement that an injective function be hard to invert. As shown in Lemma 2.1, this property is implied by combination of the lossiness and indistinguishability properties.
For our lattice-based constructions we need to consider a slightly relaxed definition of lossy TDFs, which we call almost-always lossy TDFs. Namely, with overwhelming probability, the output s of Sinj describes an injective function fs that F −1 ltdf inverts correctly on all values in the image of fs.
In other words, there is only a negligible probability (over the choice of s) that fs(·) is not injective or that F −1
s (·) for some input. Furthermore, we require only that the lossy function fs generated by S loss has image size at most 2 r with overwhelming probability. In general, the function sampler cannot check these conditions because they refer to "global" properties of the generated function. The use of almost-always lossy TDFs does not affect security in our applications (e.g., CCA-secure encryption) because the adversary has no control over the generation of trapdoor/lossy functions. Therefore the potential advantage of the adversary due to sampling an improper function is bounded by a negligible quantity.
All-But-One TDFs
For some of our applications, it is more convenient to work with a richer abstraction that we call all-but-one (ABO) trapdoor functions. In an ABO collection, each function has several branches. Almost all the branches are injective trapdoor functions (having the same trapdoor value), except for one branch which is lossy. The lossy branch is specified as a parameter to the function sampler, and its value is hidden (computationally) in the resulting function index.
We retain the same notation for n, k, r as above, and also let B = {B λ } λ∈N be a collection of sets whose elements represent the branches. Then a collection of (n, k)-all-butone trapdoor functions with branch collection B is given by a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) poly-time algorithms (S abo , G abo , G −1 abo ) having the following properties:
Sampling a trapdoor function with given lossy branch:
for any b
, where s is a function index and t is its trapdoor. Just as with lossy TDFs, we also need to consider an "almost-always" relaxation of the ABO definition. Specifically, the injective, invertible, and lossy properties need only hold with overwhelming probability over the choice of the function index s. For similar reasons, using an almost-always ABO collection does not affect security in our applications.
Basic Relations
Lossy and ABO trapdoor functions are equivalent for appropriate choices of parameters; we briefly sketch this equivalence here. First, suppose we have a collection of (n, k)-ABO TDFs having branch set B = {0, 1} (without loss of generality). Then we can construct a collection of (n, k)- ltdf can invert any injective function (with the trapdoor) because it is evaluated on a non-lossy branch.
We now sketch the converse implication. Suppose that (S ltdf , F ltdf , F −1 ltdf ) gives a collection of (n, k)-lossy TDFs. We can construct an (n, k)-ABO collection having branch set B = {0, 1} as follows: the generator S abo (1 λ , b * ) outputs (s, t) = ((s0, s1), t) where (s0, t0) 
, and t = t 1−b * . The evaluation algorithm on index s = (s0, s1), branch b and value x outputs F ltdf (s b , x) . The inversion algorithm on trapdoor t, branch b = 1 − b * , and input y outputs F −1 ltdf (t, y). It is straightforward to verify the required properties of this construction.
Additionally, an ABO collection for branch set B = {0, 1} and input length n having residual leakage r = n − k implies an ABO collection for branch set B = {0, 1} and the same input length n having residual leakage · r (this is therefore only interesting when the original leakage r < n/ ). The main idea is to generate, for desired lossy branch b * ∈ {0, 1} , individual functions having lossy branches b * i (i.e., the ith bit of b * ). The evaluation algorithm on branch b ∈ {0, 1} and input x outputs the value of each corresponding function on branch bi and x. Then when b = b * , the branches differ on some bit i, and x can be recovered from the corresponding function value (given the trapdoor). When b = b * , then all functions are lossy and the total number of possible outputs is at most (2 r ) .
Primitives Implied by Lossy TDFs
We now show that lossy TDFs (having appropriate parameters) are sufficient for black-box constructions of other important cryptographic primitives, such as standard (injective) trapdoor functions and collision-resistant hash functions.
Trapdoor Functions
Our first result shows that the injective functions from a lossy collection are indeed trapdoor functions in the standard sense (i.e., easy to invert with a trapdoor, and hard to invert otherwise). Suppose by way of contradiction that I is a PPT inverter, i.e., that I(1 λ , s, fs(x)) outputs x with nonnegligible probability over the choice of (s, t) ← Sinj(1 λ ), x ← {0, 1} n , and I's randomness. We use I to build a distinguisher D between injective functions (those generated by Sinj) and lossy ones (those generated by S loss ).
D works as follows: on input a function index s, choose x ← {0, 1} n and compute y = F ltdf (s, x). Let x ← I(s, y). If x = x, output "injective," otherwise output "lossy."
We now analyze D. First, if s is generated by Sinj(1 λ ), then by assumption on I, we have x = x with nonnegligible probability, and D outputs "injective." Now, suppose s is generated by S loss (1 λ ). Then the probability (over the choice of s and x) that even an unbounded I predicts x is given by the average min-entropy of x conditioned on (s, fs(x)), i.e., the prediction probability is at most 2 −H∞(x|(s,fs(x))) . Because fs(·) takes at most 2 n−k values, we have
, the probability that I(s, y) outputs x, and D outputs "injective," is negl(λ). We conclude that D distinguishes injective functions from lossy ones, a contradiction.
Collision-Resistant Hashing
We now show how to construct UOWHFs and collisionresistant hash functions from a lossy TDF collection. The construction is quite simple: the hash function H is defined as H(x) := h(f (x)), where f is an injective function from a lossy TDF collection, and h is selected from a universal family of hash functions. For an appropriate output length of the universal family, the function H shrinks its input.
For appropriate values of the lossiness, finding collisions implies the ability to distinguish injective functions from lossy ones. The main idea behind the security proof (for both UOWHFs and CRHFs) is the following: in a real instance of the function H = h•f , collisions must occur in the "outer" application of h, because f is injective. Now consider an alternate construction in which we replace f by a lossy function f . Then for appropriate settings of the parameters, the function h has no collisions (with overwhelming probability), either on the target point (for UOWHFs) or on the entire function (for CRHFs). Therefore all collisions in the alternate construction must occur in the "inner" application of f . We can therefore distinguish between injective and lossy functions by whether a given collision of H occurs in its outer or inner part. We now proceed more formally for the construction of CRHFs (which are also UOWHFs).
Assume without loss of generality that the input length n (λ) = λ equals the security parameter. Let (S ltdf , F ltdf , F −1 ltdf ) give a collection of (n, k)-lossy trapdoor functions {fs : {0, 1} n → R} having arbitrary range R and residual leakage r = n − k ≤ ρn for some constant ρ < 1/2. (An almost-always family would also suffice.) Let H = {hi : R → {0, 1}
κn } be a universal family of hash functions where κ = 2ρ + δ < 1 for any constant δ ∈ (0, 1 − 2ρ).
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The algorithms for the collection of collision-resistant hash functions are as follows:
and disposes of t. It also chooses h ← H. The index of the generated hash function is i = (s, h).
Lemma 2.2. The algorithms (Scrh, Fcrh) described above give a collection of collision-resistant hash functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} κn .
Proof. Let C be an adversary in the collision-finding game for the collection we described. Specifically, C takes an index i = (s, h) and outputs a supposed collision x, x ∈ {0, 1} n . Let E be the event that the output x, x is a valid collision. Let E be the event that x, x is a valid collision and F ltdf (s, x) = F ltdf (s, x ). In the real game, because F ltdf (s, ·) is injective, the events E and E are equivalent.
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Then it suffices to show that p0 = Pr [E ] in the real game is negligible, via an alternate game.
The alternate game proceeds as follows: C is given an index i = (s, h) where s is instead generated by S loss , and h is chosen as above. Then by indistinguishability of lossy and injective functions, p1 = Pr [E ] in the alternate game is only negligibly different from p0. We now show that p1 is negligible (even if C is unbounded ).
Fix the s chosen in the alternate game, and let I = F ltdf (s, {0, 1} n ) be the image of the lossy function. By lossiness, |I| ≤ 2 ρn . Now consider any fixed distinct pair y, y ∈ I: by universality of H, we have Pr h [h(y) = h(y )] ≤ 2 −κn . Summing over all the (at most) 2 2ρn such pairs via a union bound, we see that
Now consider the event E in the alternate game: for x, x to be a valid collision and y = F ltdf (s, x) and y = F ltdf (s, x ) to be distinct requires h(y) = h(y ). By above, the probability of such an event is negligible, and we are done.
Discussion.
The crucial hypothesis in the above proof is that the residual leakage of the lossy TDF collection is strictly less than n/2, so as to circumvent the birthday bound. For UOWHFs, it suffices for the leakage to be ρn for (say) some constant ρ < 1, because we only need to rule out collisions for the specific input chosen ahead of time by the adversary.
We note that alternate constructions, in which s is generated by S loss instead of Sinj, can also yield UOWHFs and CRHFs. This construction might even seem more natural, because F ltdf (s, ·) can be seen as "compressing" its input into a small image (of possibly long strings), followed by a "smoothing" step in which h maps the image to a set of short strings. The proof is symmetric to the one above, with the event E redefined to require that x, x be a valid hash collision and that F ltdf (s, x) = F ltdf (s, x ). Then in the real game (the "lossy" case), events E and E are equivalent except when h contains a collision on the image I; in the alternate game (the "injective" case), event E never occurs.
Finally, we note that these constructions do not require the trapdoor property of lossy TDFs in either the construction or the security proof. Therefore, it is possible to construct collision-resistant hash functions simply from a collection of lossy functions, a weaker primitive whose injective functions need not have trapdoors.
REALIZATION FROM DDH
We now present constructions of lossy TDFs and all-butone TDFs using groups in which the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard. The construction will illustrate our core ideas and will also serve as a template for the latticebased constructions in the next section.
We begin by giving a brief overview of the DDH problem. Then we show how to build lossy TDFs from DDH-hard groups, and how to extend the construction to build all-butone TDFs. 5 In the almost-always case, comparable events are equivalent if we add the constraint that F ltdf (s, ·) is actually injective, which fails with negligible probability.
Background
Let G be a an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a tuple G = (p, G, g) where p is a prime, G is a cyclic group of order p, and g is a generator of G.
Our construction will make use of groups for which the DDH problem is believed to be hard. The DDH assumption is that the ensemble˘(G,
, and a, b, c ← Zp are uniform and independent.
Preliminary Tools
For the remainder of this section, we implicitly assume that a group description G = (p, G, g) ← G(1 λ ) is fixed and known to all algorithms. (In our TDF constructions, this group will be generated by the function sampler S ltdf and made part of the function description.)
One can see that S's output is distributed according to either H k−1 or H k , depending on whether c * was an encryption of i,j or mi,j (respectively). Because these two cases are indistinguishable by the security of the ElGamal variant, so are H k−1 and H k , and we are done.
Lossy TDF
We now describe the function generation, evaluation, and inversion algorithms for our lossy TDF.
• Sampling an injective/lossy function. The injective function generator Sinj(1 λ ) first selects G = (p, G, g) ← G(1 λ ). The function index is a matrix encryption C (as described above) of the identity I ∈ Z n×n p (and implicitly the group description G). The trapdoor information t consists of the the corresponding decryption keys zj for j ∈ [n].
The lossy function generation algorithm S loss (1 λ ) likewise selects G ← G(1 λ ). The function index is a matrix encryption C of 0 ∈ Z n×n p (and G's description). There is no trapdoor output.
• Evaluation algorithm. F ltdf takes as input (C, x), where C is a function index (a matrix encryption of some M = (mi,j) ∈ Z n×n p
) and x ∈ {0, 1} n is an n-bit input interpreted as a vector. The output is the vector of ciphertexts y = xC, where the linear product is interpreted in the natural way using the homomorphic operations of the cryptosystem. By construction of C and the homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem, we have
where r = (r1, . . . , rn) is the vector of random exponents used to construct C.
Note that if the function index C was generated by Sinj (i.e., M = I), we have yj = E h j (xj; R), whereas if C was generated by S loss (i.e., M = 0) we have yj = E h j (0; R). Note also that the randomness R inherent in yj is the same for all j ∈ [n]; therefore, we may represent y more compactly using n+1 group elements in a manner similar to that for matrix encryption.
• Inversion algorithm. F −1 ltdf takes as input (t, y) where the trapdoor information t consists of the decryption keys (z1, . . . , zn). The output is x ∈ {0, 1} n where xj = Dz j (yj).
Shorter outputs.
Our basic construction takes an n-bit input as a binary string and has an output of n ciphertexts (which can be represented compactly using n + 1 group elements). We note that it is possible to achieve somewhat shorter output size by parsing the input into messages from a space of size 2 α . In this generalization, function outputs will consist of n/α + 1 group elements. However, there is a trade-off in the inversion time, as the ElGamal decryption algorithm will need to enumerate over the possible 2 α values. Therefore, this generalization works only for small values of α, i.e., α = O(log λ).
Alternatively, we can also realize a more efficient variant of our construction over Z N 2 , where N is the product of two primes chosen at random by the setup algorithm. In this variant, we can use the techniques of Paillier [31] to create an inversion routine that will know the factorization of N and thus has access to an efficient trapdoor for an order N subgroup. The evaluation routine can then process the input in blocks of α = lg(N ) bits. The resulting ABO system gives rise to a CCA-secure cryptosystem having comparable performance to that of the Cramer-Shoup [13] projectivehash system when realized with Paillier encryption.
Theorem 3.2. The algorithms described above give a collection of (n, n − lg p)-lossy TDFs under the DDH assumption for G.
Proof. We have shown invertibility for injective functions via the trapdoor information, and indistinguishability between injective and lossy functions follows by Lemma 3.1. It remains to show the lossiness property.
Recall that for a function generated by S loss , for any input x the output y is such that yj = E h j (0; R) for some fixed R ∈ Zp (dependent on x) and fixed hj . Therefore the number of possible function outputs is at most p, the residual leakage r is at most lg p, and the lossiness is k = n − r ≥ n − lg p.
We refer the reader to the full version of our paper [33] for the description of an All-But-One TDF.
